The Problem of Induction is Not Just for Naturalists

Something that really gets under my skin is when a theist latches onto a general problem in philosophy and uses it as a means of 'discrediting' the naturalist or atheist worldview. Often times the eternally on-going debate over the foundations and justification of morality is the focus, while other times logic itself is the concern, as in the Transcendental Argument for God. However, there are also those theists who raise the problem of induction as a flaw in the naturalist worldview

Inductive reasoning is, to put it simply, reasoning from a specific case to a more general case. Most life depends on water to exist, so it seems that any new life form we discover will likely depend on it too. Induction differs from deduction in providing less robust conclusions. Deductive logic deals with possibility, while inductive logic deals with probability. We use induction to make inferences about the world around us all the time. It can be found in marketing and advertising, history, psychology, sports, and even science.

The problem of induction is commonly associated with David Hume, who questioned how induction might be justified in his 1748 work, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. What is it that permits us to generalize from a particular, to connect our experience of life depending on water with the proposition or expectation that new life forms will depend on water as well? Hume noted that we make this connection not by deduction, but by induction, the very method we're employing

Centuries prior, Sextus Empiricus gave a brief and fitting summary of the problem:

When they propose to establish the universal from the particulars by means of induction, they will effect this by a review of either all or some of the particulars. But if they review some, the induction will be insecure, since some of the particulars omitted in the induction may contravene the universal; while if they are to review all, they will be toiling at the impossible, since the particulars are infinite and indefinite.

The problem of induction relates to what is usually called "the uniformity of nature". Science and logic seem to rely on the assumption that the natural world is in such a state of uniformity as to allow us to make reasonable inferences. If this assumption is untrue, then a great deal of what we think we know is wrong. But if this assumption is true, it would seem to call for an explanation, one that induction itself can't provide without begging the question.

Several responses have been made since Hume, with the most notable being Karl Popper. As a philosopher of science, Popper's approach primarily centers around scientific method, which he saw as bearing the responsibility of finding and correcting errors, rather than making inductive inferences. In fact, he argued that induction is a mere myth, and the way by which we actually create knowledge is through conjecture and criticism. Popper's solution has received plenty of criticism too, with the most substantial being that it doesn't really solve the problem of induction. His theory of falsification can go to show that, based on past experience, some scientific ideas are false, but it can't demonstrate when a scientific idea is true, a point he even conceded (Popper, 1979).

There is also the response of Hans Reichenbach, who offered a pragmatic justification of induction. His argument is strikingly familiar to Pascal's Wager in that he suggests that if we go with induction and it turns out to be true, we stand a better chance of success then if we were to go with any alternative reasoning, regardless of whether induction is true or not. Like Pascal's Wager, though, this pragmatic approach is only valuable in that it might point us to a useful strategy; it cannot tell us whether or not that strategy is founded on anything true (unless one accepts a pragmatist theory of truth, which comes with its own additional objections).

I am one of many people who concedes that the problem of induction has yet to be satisfied on epistemic grounds. Things like the uniformity of nature are really assumptions we make based on inferences for which we do not have solid justification. This is a real problem in philosophy.

Does the theist manage to avoid this problem by positing the existence of a god? In an article critiquing secular responses to the problem of induction, author James N. Anderson states at the tail end, "Of course, a Person for whom universal a priori knowledge of the very constitution of the universe is attainable (and perhaps even essential) would be an invaluable ally in such an epistemological predicament — especially so if that Person were inclined toward revelation of Himself and His universe." (Anderson, 2000)

Numerous assumptions are packed into this single sentence, but it is quite typical of the standard theistic belief regarding justification of induction, I've found. God created the universe and knows all about it, god has revealed himself and his works to human beings, and human beings like Anderson have been able to comprehend it as his god intended. These beliefs are fervently defended by apologists as being more than simple assumptions, but the ways in which they are defended are telling.

How do you know god created this universe? Look at the complexity, beauty, and order of nature, they might say. How do you know god has revealed himself to us in scripture? Look at the inerrancy of a text like the bible and the fulfilled prophecies in it. How do you know you've accurately received the revelation of god? I feel his presence and see confirmations of my faith in my life.

These are not ad hoc defenses of theistic beliefs. They make frequent appearances in the apologetic efforts of men like William Lane Craig, Gary Habermas, Josh McDowell, Alister McGrath, N.T. Wright, and many, many others. The beliefs that Anderson and his fellow theists see as giving justification to their use of induction are themselves justified by induction. There is no avoidance of the problem by tossing a deity into the mix and pretending that its existence would resolve everything. Note that even if the theist's god does exist, he is still left with the responsibility of justifying his own beliefs, a task which he undertakes by inductive reasoning.

In short, there is at present no escape from the problem of induction, not for theists or non-theists. When I engage in debates over this matter with believers, I call attention to this fact and invite them to see something like the problem of induction as a philosophical question to be tackled in mutual effort. We're both affected by this, so let's stop pointing fingers and look for a solution instead of trying to gain a foothold over the other. If induction has a secular solution, it will be available to theists as well, and should make no significant dent in their faith. But if the only thing you're interested in is a 'solution' that permits you to taunt the other side of the fence about how superior your worldview is, then it's no wonder your arguments revolve so much around the consistency of views than around the truth of those views. The irony is that consistency is a criterion that very often (perhaps always?) employs induction.

So what do we make of this problem? Is it a cause to stop drawing inferences altogether, to worry that life has no meaning, and to go sit in a dark corner and contemplate suicide? No, I dare say it's not. However, it is a cause to make us think more carefully about the inferences we draw, to consider that life may not have some of the meanings we ascribe to it, and to open ourselves up to new and different possibilities. Maybe induction is not perfectly justifiable because we tend to think of it in the wrong way, as if it ought to be more deductive or more absolute. Probability theory is not about making flawless predictions, but it can and does yield fairly reliable and practical results time after time, in discipline after discipline. Thus, I see our lack of a satisfactory answer to the problem of induction as no cause for drastic alarm. It is nonetheless a problem that merits interest, so that we don't forget our limitations and we continue to use caution in the conclusions we come to.


Sources:
Anderson, Secular Responses to the Problem of Induction, Proginosko.com (2000).
Popper, Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 7

Conspiracy Theories and Appeals to Authority

If there's one thing conspiracy theorists are good at, it's making appeals to authority. Whether we're talking 9/11 truthers, climate deniers, creationists, UFO believers, or New World Order nuts, there always seems to be a tendency to name-drop some "expert" who "totally PROVES" the conspiracy in question, rather than providing evidence or arguments firsthand. Check out this website, check out this book, check out this guy's work... the believer may know a few of the primary lines of rhetoric from memory, but rarely are they able to go into a detailed debate without tossing out the names of other conspiracy theorist sources. The funny thing is that you can usually detect an immediate frustration when you call someone out on using biased sources. The reaction is almost always, "Well, so what?!"

An appeal to authority is not always a fallacy, though it is often used fallaciously. There are two major factors that determine the strength of an appeal to authority: if the authority is a legitimate expert, and if there is a consensus among other legitimate experts. By legitimate expert, I mean someone who is actually qualified in the relevant subject - your average preacher is not an expert on evolution, nor is someone like Kent Hovind, who earned his credentials from a diploma mill. That's not to say that someone needs a degree to be considered an expert, but that they must have a demonstrated knowledge of the subject, and in addition, their knowledge must be confirmed by other experts, preferably those who do hold credentials.

Many of the names dropped by conspiracy theorists fail to accommodate either factor. Alex Jones is not a legitimate expert on any subject. The vast majority of scientists disagree with creationist and climate denial theories. When conspiracy writers have no relevant credentials, they call themselves "researchers." Being an independent researcher is nothing in itself, but when a researcher's opinions stray far from the consensus of established experts and qualify as extraordinary claims, it is perfectly reasonable to reject the appeal to authority as fallacious. Conspiracy theorists like to object, saying that consensus and college degrees don't determine truth, and though they're right in principle, the odds that some amateur researcher has stumbled on a real secret missed by countless legitimate experts are quite negligible - it's part of why they are called conspiracies.

Appeals to authority are inductive arguments, which cannot produce a guaranteed conclusion, but only a probable one. Combine this with the improbable needle in a haystack reality of conspiracy theories that I just described, and things look fairly bleak. This is why I'm always much more interested to hear someone's own arguments for their beliefs, rather than just be given a recommendation for some crackpot who I'm not talking to. It seems inconsiderate as well. I'm taking the time to have a conversation with you, so at least grant me the courtesy of a real conversation, not one in which the flow is interrupted by periodic references to books I haven't read, websites I haven't viewed, and so forth. If you can't make a case for your beliefs on your own, it doesn't seem like you really grasp them all that well. And if that's true, why on earth should I care to hear you out in the first place?

The Value of Reason

I'm often disappointed to see how little people understand the concept and use of reason. Reason is typically seen as the buzzword of intellectuals who engage in debate and lay out formal argumentation in books or articles. Yet we all utilize the tool of reason on a daily basis, in ways that most of us probably are not aware of. Even when you view a painting in an art gallery and think to yourself, "I like this. It would go well in my living room," you are reasoning that purchasing the painting would be beneficial in the enjoyment it would bring to yourself and to your guests, perhaps. Reason is how we make sense of things in our world - it's how we make choices, how we verify information, and how we communicate to others why we have made a particular choice and why we do, or do not, accept certain information.

Aside from reason there is no other method for assessing truth that has shown to be reliable. Personal experience is sometimes suggested, but we all interpret our experiences, and these interpretations are always made from reason. They may not be reasonable, but they do use reason, even if incorrectly. This is why many miracle claims are accompanied by reports of the numbers of people present, the slant of those involved, the improbability of the event, and more. Even believers in the supernatural recognize that reason is a vital part of making a persuasive argument to others. Asking us to believe without reason is far less likely to result in a successful conversion than providing bad reasons to believe.

Recently I talked to an individual who said that he believes that there is more truth out there than what we can find through science and reason. There are also truths in religion, poetry, and metaphor, he said. I don't say that science is all there is because, for one reason, I know that science misses the significance of things like poetry, music, literature, and other media. I do believe there is some truth in religion, as well as poetry and metaphor, but there is still one step left out, which is how one finds these truths from such sources. Again, the only reliable method is reason. Using reason, we can take a story like Jesus and the adulterous woman, or Shakespeare's thoughts on mercy in Act 4 of The Merchant of Venice, and we can apply them to our lives and to the facts of the world at large to find their meaningfulness and, in that sense, find truth.

How else is one to find these truths? One has to first understand the passages before they can be appreciated, and part of appreciating them means uncovering how they relate to us. Since reason is how we make sense of things in our world, we use reason to interpret passages of scripture and poetry, just as we use it to interpret personal experiences. Any time you try to figure things out, reason is involved. The funny thing is that this person, in trying to persuade me of his belief that reason and science are not "all there is," was forced to use the only tenable method he has: reason. And in fact, all of our beliefs are dependent on reason.

Since we can't believe what we know to be false, we must think something is true if we believe it. In order to regard something as true, we have to have some basis for considering it true, whether personal experience, evidence, hearsay, loose connections, or whatever. We don't just suddenly and arbitrarily decide that something is true, we figure out that it's true (even if we're mistaken). By good use or bad use, we have come to hold the beliefs we now hold thanks to reason. This may be one of the most powerful realizations in understanding the place and value of reason in our thinking. Even the belief that reason is limited requires reason to be sustained.

Smart People Don't Always Believe Smart Things

Smart people are very good at justifying things they came to believe for non-smart reasons.
Perhaps no other statement has rung so true, in my experience, than this one from Michael Shermer. It spells the death of appeals to authority. Recently I was told by someone that Muslims offer better arguments for their beliefs than Christians, because they "seem to know what they are talking about what with them being Doctors and all that kind of stuff." This is possibly one of the most imbecilic remarks I've encountered in my conversations with religious believers. Not only does it ignore the many non-Muslim physicians out there (including atheists and agnostics), but it operates on a non-existent connection between medical skill and factually accurate belief.

Doctors may be very intelligent people in their respective fields, yet religion is the realm of philosophy, history, myth, and other fields that are not always well known by medical experts. More importantly, though, even people who have studied religion extensively are not to be trusted off the bat. Certain degrees may warrant further credibility, but only in addition to strong arguments and persuasive evidence. It's the depth of exposure and research that culminates in the credibility assigned to those degrees, and that will be shown in the strength of the case one makes for a particular position. Shermer's statement beautifully illustrates this fact.

Intelligent people are quite capable of compartmentalizing their beliefs and sealing off specific ones in a "do-not-disturb" section. Isaac Newton believed in alchemy, but we need not believe it, even if he was a brilliant scientist. Darwin consulted alternative therapies, but we need not accept them, even if he was also a brilliant scientist. There's nothing about a Muslim holding a physician's degree that tells us whether or not his belief in Islam is founded on good evidence and strong reason. Religious believers are more than willing to embrace the character of those whom they deem to be nice reflections of the religion, but when we point out the garish reflections of suicide bombers, inquisitors, and the likes, cries of a mistaken connection abound.

An appeal to authority should be easily recognized as a fallacy almost at first glance, especially in an age where "experts" are being viewed with increasing skepticism by paranoid and deluded folks like Don McLeroy, the former chair of the Texas State Board of Education. Unfortunately, the fallacy persists. Maybe if we learn to emphasize the value of logic and evidence, then such problems will be avoided, but until we do, I remain doubtful that this common sense truth will really catch on. Still, in the meantime we should all do our part to try and educate others about the fallacy of an appeal to authority.

The Media is Anathema to Critical Thinking

One of the big stories to gush out of online media today is that of a 1928 film clip depicting what some are suggesting is a woman talking on a cell phone. In numerous news articles, the figure is called a 'time traveler'. This has to be one of the most noteworthy cases of blatant disregard for critical thinking that I've seen from major internet media sources. Viewing the footage, you can see that the individual is holding something up to her head and talking... and that's all. The quality is grainy and dark, like most film shot in the '20s, so there's no telling what's in her hand. And this has led to speculation about time travel?

Has no one thought to ask how a time traveler would get cell phone service back in 1928? People have already suggested that the woman may actually be carrying an ear horn, or early hearing aid device, but you probably won't find that in news headlines. Since the footage is from the premiere of a Charlie Chaplin film, perhaps the woman is pulling a prank. Some have even surmised that the figure is actually a man dressed as a woman. Or maybe she's just covering her ear because it hurts, because it's gotten cold (she is wearing a pretty hefty coat), or she doesn't want the camera on her face.

Whatever the explanation, once again the media has blown an extremely trivial and unimpressive discovery into something paranormal. You might ask, 'it's only the media, why do you care?' I care because while I've noticed how many people tend to distrust the media on natural explanations and government affairs, they seem to exercise far less critical thinking when the reports involve unexplained phenomena. Another recent example is the so-called UFO spotted in New York on October 13th. A couple days after the sighting, the circular floating objects were suggested to be... you guessed it: balloons, which had gotten loose from an engagement party for a teacher at a nearby elementary school.

However, in the Associated Press' video on the incident and explanation, interviews with a few witnesses show that people aren't buying the balloons theory. Why? No one really offers a reason, they only seem to prefer believing the fantastical story to the mundane one. The craziest thing is that close-up footage of the UFOs in the AP video shows what looks startlingly like a cluster of silvery balloons. But if that's "the official story", we can't believe it, and the media went to great lengths to remain impartial on the issue.

I think the media realizes that most of our world still prefers magical thinking to rational thinking, and in that saddening fact they find a way to climb in their ratings.